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ABSTRACT
Despite the extensive research on audit fees, few studies have
examined the effect of audit fees on the cost of debt. Based on
the credence goods theory, we examine whether the effect of
audits on the cost of debt is affected by the type of audit (volun-
tary or mandatory) and the audit fees, as well as whether there is
a combined effect of voluntary audits and audit fees, so that the
effect of voluntary audits on the cost of debt is affected by audit
fees. Using a sample of Spanish SMEs, we find an asymmetric
effect of audit fees on the cost of debt: higher audit fees are
associated with a lower cost of debt for voluntarily audited com-
panies, while the association is not significant for mandatory
audits. Results suggest that, although the type of audit and the
audit fees do not have a direct effect on the credibility of audits,
the combination of both factors has relevance for lenders, so that
higher audit fees in the voluntary setting are positively valued by
them. The study contributes to the literature on auditing by
showing that voluntary audits are relevant for capital providers as
long as audits are perceived of quality.
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Despite the extensive research about audit fees, there are few studies that have exam-
ined the effect of audit fees on the credibility of accounting information and on the
cost of debt, and the evidence is mixed (Dhaliwal, Gleason, Heitzman, & Melendrez,
2008; Jiang & Zhou, 2017). Furthermore, in spite of the assumed idea that audits help
to enhance the credibility of accounting information, the empirical evidence on the
association between voluntary audits and the cost of debt is mixed (Huguet &
Gandıa, 2014; Lennox & Pittman, 2011). We consider that the credibility of voluntary
audits may depend on the audit fees paid by the auditee. Therefore, this study states
whether the association between the cost of debt and voluntary audits can be affected
by the fees paid to auditors. Particularly, we consider whether, in the voluntary audit
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setting, there are differences in the perception of audit quality by users, or in their
signalling effect, based on the fees paid to auditors.
Based on the credence goods theory (Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006), and consider-
ing the previous evidence on the audit fee premium observed among voluntary audits
(Gandıa & Huguet, 2018) we state that audits, as credence goods (Causholli &
Knechel, 2012; Esplin, Jamal, & Sunder, 2018; Hay & Knechel, 2010; Knechel, Niemi,
& Sundgren, 2008), use price to signal quality. Since lenders cannot a priori ascertain
the quality of the audit, they may not rely on audited financial statements when com-
panies are voluntarily audited. Nevertheless, if companies seek to signal a true com-
mitment with accounting quality, they will be willing to pay for it, and thus audit
fees may help companies to signal this commitment, what may enhance the credibil-
ity of their financial statements, thus reducing their cost of debt.
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are a natural setting to test the effect of vol-
untary audits, since voluntary audits are only observable in this setting in the European
Union (EU), because big private companies and listed companies are mandatorily aud-
ited. Furthermore, this setting is also useful to compare differences between voluntary
and mandatory audits, because part of them are required to be audited, whereas other
companies are exempt from the audit requirement. Also, given the rather limited use
of accounting information by lenders on the SMEs setting (Gill de Albornoz Noguer &
Illueca, 2007), the role of auditors should be examined in depth. On the other hand,
the Spanish case may shed light on the role of voluntary audits, for several reasons.
First, Spain has a relatively short history of auditing, and there is a lower tradition in
the use of accounting information compared to common-law countries. Secondly,
SMEs have a great importance on the Spanish economy. Finally, the Spanish Statutory
Audit Thresholds (SAT) are lower than those generally applied in the EU, so letting us
compare voluntary and mandatory audits in a relatively homogeneous sample.
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to empirically examine whether the effect of
audits on the cost of debt is affected by the type of audit (voluntary or mandatory) and
the audit fees, as well as whether there is a combined effect of voluntary audits and
audit fees, so that the effect of voluntary audits on the cost of debt is affected by audit
fees. To do this, we use a sample of Spanish SMEs, in which we include both voluntar-
ily and mandatorily audited companies, and we posit a linear regression model, esti-
mated using fixed effects, in which we analyse the effect of the explanatory variables (if
audit is voluntary or mandatory; audit fees; and the interaction term of both variables)
and a series of control variables commonly used in the literature, on the cost of debt.
Results show that, although voluntary audits are charged with a higher cost of debt
compared to mandatory audits, higher audit fees are associated with a lower cost of
debt for voluntarily audited companies, while there is not a significant effect of audit
fees on the cost of debt for mandatory audits, suggesting an asymmetric effect of audit
fees on the cost of debt which depends on the type of audit. Results remain unchanged
after the inclusion of auditor-type variables (Big 4, Middle-Tier auditors and small
auditors) and the inclusion of the cost of debt lagged one period as a control variable,
and the use of abnormal audit fees, rather than actual fees, reports qualitatively similar
results. These results suggest that, although voluntary audits are not per se more cred-
ible than mandatory audits, the audit fees paid by voluntarily audited companies are
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positively valued by debt capital providers. These results are linked to prior literature
that shows an audit fee premium for voluntary audits as compared to mandatory
audits, what is related with the signalling effect of price for credence goods.
We have to note that audit-based studies may present endogeneity problems, as
both the auditor choice and the audit decision are not a random assignment but a
corporate decision, so ordinary least squares estimations may be affected by a self-
selection bias. We tackle this issue using fixed-effects regressions, which have been
previously used in the literature and partially mitigates the endogeneity problems.
Nevertheless, we have to admit that it does not completely solve the problem as long
as the causal relation between the cost of debt and audit can be bidirectional.
Results are of relevance for accounting and auditing practitioners, since they show
that voluntary audits are relevant for capital providers, in the extent that voluntary
audits are perceived of quality. In that sense, auditees need to signal their commit-
ment with accounting quality not only through the appointment of audits, but with
their willingness to pay for services of quality. On the other hand, auditors need to
protect the association price/quality through the performance of high quality services.
Results are also of relevance for managers, who are in charge of the preparation of
the financial statements of the companies and have to look out for the credibility and
reputation of the company, including the financial information.
The study contributes to the previous literature by examining how audit fees affect
the credibility of voluntary and mandatory audits, showing that the relevance of price
to signal audit quality is asymmetric and depends on the type of audit. In that sense,
the study extends and complements research on the association between audit fees
with audit’s perceived quality and credibility. This study also contributes to the scant
literature about the role of audits on SMEs and its consequences, especially voluntary
audits. In that sense, this is the first study that examines whether there are differences
on the association between audit fees and perceived quality based on the comparison
of voluntary and mandatory audits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we review prior litera-
ture and develop our research hypotheses; Section 3 describes the sample and
explains the research design; in Section 4 we present the results of the analysis; and
Section 5 presents our conclusions and the limitations of the study.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Voluntary audits and cost of debt
Previous literature has examined the association between voluntary audits and the
cost of debt, and the evidence is mixed. On the one hand, some studies have found a
significant association between voluntary audits and the cost of debt (Dedman &
Kausar, 2012; Kim, Simunic, Stein, & Yi, 2011; Lennox & Pittman, 2011; Minnis,
2011), which is linked to the information role of auditors, and the signalling effect
that voluntary audits have for lenders, increasing the credibility of financial informa-
tion. In that sense, Lennox and Pittman (2011) and Dedman and Kausar (2012)
examine the effects of the change from mandatory to voluntary audits in the UK, and
they find evidence that companies that continued being audited in the voluntary
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setting obtained upgrades to their credit ratings, whereas companies that chose to opt
out of the audits suffered downgrades on them. On the other hand, Kim et al. (2011)
find that voluntarily audited companies have a significantly lower cost of debt than
non-audited companies in a sample of Korean SMEs, results that are similar to those
obtained by Minnis (2011), who examines the role of the auditor in the voluntary set-
ting of US private companies and finds that audits help to reduce the cost of debt,
because lenders place more weight on financial information.
Evidence from these papers support the hypothesis that voluntary audits have a signal-
ling effect over mandatory audits, what lets lenders perceive the commitment of auditees
with accounting quality. Moreover, Minnis (2011) finds that the increased credibility of
financial information for voluntarily audited companies is due to the increase of the actual
accounting quality, and accruals from audited financial statements are better predictors of
future cash flows and thus more informative. In this line, Dedman and Kausar (2012) find
that voluntarily audited companies report more conservative financial statements.
Nevertheless, other papers have not found a significant association between volun-
tary audits and the cost of debt (Allee & Yohn, 2009; Cassar, Ittner, & Cavalluzzo,
2015; Huguet & Gandıa, 2014). While Allee and Yohn (2009) and Cassar et al. (2015)
do not find that voluntary audits have a significant effect on the cost of debt, Huguet
and Gandıa (2014) only find a significant effect when companies are mandatorily
audited, suggesting an asymmetric effect of audit on the cost of debt. We have to
note that these studies examine voluntary audits on the SMEs setting. In these com-
panies, the usefulness of accounting information is not clear, because lenders rely
more on other information sources (Berger & Udell, 2006; Gill de Albornoz Noguer
& Illueca, 2007; Huguet & Gandıa, 2014). Furthermore, lenders may perceive that vol-
untary audits are not credible. Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2013) find that some
companies adopt voluntarily IAS/IFRS but do not make material changes to their
financial reporting. Similarly, some companies may choose to be voluntarily audited
in order to pretend higher perceived accounting quality, and thus lenders may request
other signals to rely on voluntary audits, an issue that we develop in Section 2.3.
Therefore, if accounting is not the main information source, lenders may not value
whether companies choose to be voluntarily audited, either because they do not con-
sider that accounting information is useful or because they do not rely on it. Since
the effect of voluntary audits on the cost of debt is not clear, we cannot state whether
there are differences on the cost of debt between voluntary and mandatory audits, so
we formulate the hypothesis in null form:
H1: The cost of debt is not significantly different for voluntarily and mandatorily
audited SMEs.
2.2. The effect of audit fees on the cost of debt
There are few papers that have examined the association between audit fees and the
cost of debt (Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Jiang & Zhou, 2017). This association may be
linked to both credibility matters of auditors, and its monitoring role. On the one
hand, a positive effect of audit fees on the cost of debt can be expected: high audit
fees may be perceived as affecting auditor independence, because of an economic
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bond between auditor and auditee. If lenders perceive that auditor independence is
jeopardised, credibility of both the audit and financial statements is impaired, thus
increasing the cost of debt.
On the other hand, theory suggests that demand for audit increases as agency
problems rise (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Esplin et al., 2018). In that sense, higher audit
fees may be perceived as the result of a more effective monitoring by the auditor, and
a consequence of the audit effort (more work hours) and the auditor experience
(higher fees per hour), what involves a mitigation of agency costs, and a decrease in
the financing costs.
Considering these arguments, Dhaliwal et al. (2008) use a sample of 560 new debt
issues to examine the association between auditor fees (both audit and non-audit
fees) and the cost of debt. The authors find evidence of a positive association between
non-audit fees and the cost of debt. They also find that the association between earn-
ings and the cost of debt rises as audit fees rise, what suggests that investors perceive
profitability, based on accounting numbers, as less reliable when audit fees are high.
In a recent study, Jiang and Zhou (2017) examine the impact that debt covenant
violations have on audit fees, and they find evidence that companies that have
recently violated a covenant pay more for audit services during the violation year and
until three years later. This rise in the audit fees is linked to the increase in the
demand for audit services. Furthermore, the authors state the hypothesis that the add-
itional increase in auditor verification helps to control agency costs in debt contracts,
mitigating the impact that debt covenant violations have on the cost of debt, and
they find empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis.
Considering the mixed evidence on the effect of audit fees on the cost of debt, we
should ask what of these effects is prevalent in the SMEs setting. In that sense, if audit
fees are perceived as a higher commitment on accounting quality, or a sign of an eco-
nomic bond between auditor and auditee and thus serious concerns about auditor
independence, is an open question. On the one hand, considering that audits are cre-
dence goods, for which price signals quality, we can expect that (both mandatorily and
voluntarily) can sign their commitment with audit quality via audit fees, and thus the
association should be negative. On the other hand, given that most private companies
are audited by small audit firms (Mareque, Lopez-Corrales, & Pedrosa, 2017), whose
reputation concerns are lower than those of the Big 4 and Middle-Tier auditors (Cano,
2010; DeAngelo, 1981; Francis & Wang, 2008) and whose income may be more
dependent on some core clients, the economic bond theory is also a plausible hypoth-
esis. We can even consider a third possibility, for which lenders do not matter about
audit fees because of the rather limited usefulness of accounting information for lenders
in the SMEs setting. Therefore, we formulate Hypothesis 2 in null form:
H2: There is not a significant association between audit fees and the cost of debt on SMEs.
2.3. Audit fees and the credibility of voluntary audits
In addition to the lack of research about the association between audit fees and the
cost of debt explained in Section 2.2, we have to note that there is no research about
the combined effect of voluntary audits and audit fees. Nevertheless, we can expect
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that audit fees play a role when examining the association between voluntary audits
and the cost of debt, because higher audit fees may add credibility to the commit-
ment of voluntarily audited companies.
We have to note that audits are credence goods (Causholli & Knechel, 2012;
Esplin et al., 2018; Hay & Knechel, 2010; Knechel et al., 2008), the main feature of
them is that the consumer cannot ascertain either the quality of the good or the
need for it, and thus price is often the only possible indicator of quality on cre-
dence goods (Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; Hay & Knechel, 2010). As we stated
in Section 2.1, lenders may not rely on voluntary audits because some companies
may pretend to feign a commitment with accounting quality when they do not
really have it. Therefore, if voluntarily audited companies seek to signal a commit-
ment with accounting quality, they should be willing to pay for it, while companies
that only want to increase the ‘perceived’ accounting quality but do not have a true
commitment with it will choose ‘low-cost’ audits. In that sense, Gandıa and
Huguet (2018) find that voluntary audits are charged with a premium as compared
to mandatory audits. This premium is linked to the signalling value of price to
show a true commitment with accounting quality, as opposed to the ‘low-cost’
auditors engaged by ‘passively compliant’ companies which are required to
be audited.
Since we expect that higher audit fees among voluntary audits may help auditees
to signal their commitment with accounting quality and to enhance their credibility,
we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3: There is a negative association between audit fees and the cost of debt on voluntarily
audited SMEs.
3. Empirical study
3.1. Sample and descriptive statistics
For the selection of the sample we have use SABI, a database that contains corporate
information from financial statements of Spanish companies. Our sample period runs
from 2010 to 2017. We initially selected data from audited private companies that
have been, for the period 2010–2017, below the maximum thresholds established by
the Directive 2013/34/EU to consider a company is small. According to the Directive,
small companies are defined as those which on their balance sheet dates do not
exceed at least two out of the following thresholds: e6,000,000 for the total assets;
e12,000,000 for the net turnover; and 50 employees.
The Directive states that small companies are not required to be audited.
Nevertheless, most EU countries apply lower Statutory Audit Thresholds (SAT). In
Spain, private companies are not required to be audited if they do not exceed two
out of three criteria for two consecutive years: e2,850,000 for the total assets;
e5,700,000 for the net turnover; and 50 employees. We have to note that these SAT
do not currently meet with those used in Spain to define a company as a SME1
(which are in line with those considered as the standard ones in the Directive 2013/
34/UE, e4,000,000 for the total assets, e8,000,000 for the net turnover, and 50
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employees). Therefore, the use of the maximum EU limits, which are higher than
the Spanish SAT and the Spanish thresholds to consider a company a SME, involves
that our sample is composed of companies below Spanish SAT (voluntarily audits)
and above SAT (mandatory audits), and thus it lets us compare mandatory and vol-
untary audits, avoiding an excessive variation in company size within the sample.
We have to note that, although companies below SAT are exempt from audit by
size criteria, they are required to be audited in certain conditions.
Specifically, listed companies, companies that issue bonds in public offering, finan-
cial and insurance companies, and companies that receive grants or provide goods
and services to the Public Administration (above the limits established by the
Government) are mandatorily audited. Furthermore, when shareholders that represent
at least the 5% of the share capital request for an audit, the company is also manda-
torily audited. However, since SABI does not include information about the reason a
company is audited, we cannot state whether audited companies below SAT are man-
datory audits. Nevertheless, we have to note that some of the mandatory cases (listed
companies, companies that issue bonds in public offering, and financial companies)
are excluded through our sample selection process. On other hand, since companies
that receive grants or provide goods and services to the Public Administration above
the Government thresholds have a significant size, they are probably mandatorily
audited because of the size thresholds. Therefore, our assumption that companies
below SAT are voluntarily audited is plausible.
Observations from companies in financial and insurance industries and firms hav-
ing unlimited liability are excluded. Furthermore, we eliminate observations that have
no information to calculate the financing costs, observations with missing data about
audit fees, and observations with negative values for assets, liabilities or financing
expenses. In order to alleviate the influence of outliers, the proxy for the cost of debt
was truncated at percentiles 5-95, and the rest of continuous variables are truncated
at percentiles 1-99.
Table 1 shows the sample distribution. As we can see in Panel A, the final sample
has 19,950 observations from 5,529 companies, with 1,748 observations from compa-
nies below SAT (and thus a priori voluntarily audited) and 18,202 observations from
companies which are mandatorily audited. We have to note that voluntary audits in
Spain represent 29 percent of total audits (Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditorıa de
Cuentas, 2018). Considering that the sample percentage is lower, we can assume that
our assumption for voluntary audits (observations below SAT) is not overstating the
proportion of voluntary audits. Panel B shows the sample distribution of the audited
SMEs by auditor choice (Big 4/Middle-Tier/rest of auditors). We have to note the
low proportion of companies audited by large auditors, although the proportion of
companies which are audited by Big 4 or Middle-Tier auditors is higher among vol-
untary audits that for mandatory audits.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables. We observe
that, on average, voluntarily audited companies have a lower cost of debt, are smaller,
report lower profitability and leverage, have higher liquidity and solvency ratio, show
a higher growth rate, and pay lower fees.
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3.2. Research design
We test the hypotheses with the following models:
COST Dit ¼ aþ b1VOLit þ b2LNFEESit þ b3INTERit þ c4CONTROLit þ eit (1a)
COST Dit ¼ aþ b1VOLit þ b2LNFEESit þ b3INTERit þ b3LARGEit þ b3BIGit
þ c4CONTROLit þ eit
(1b)
The dependent variable in both models is the cost of debt paid by the companies
(COST_D). Since this variable is not directly observable, we estimate a proxy, which
is calculated as the ratio between the interest paid and the average financing debt
between the beginning and the end of the year. We are aware that, although this vari-
able is commonly used as a proxy for the cost of debt, it involves several limitations
(Cassar, 2011; Huguet & Gandıa, 2014). First, the variable is a noisy measure of the
cost of debt because it considers the average level of debt rather than the specific
loans. We eliminate outliers at percentiles 5-95 in order to mitigate this limitation
(Huguet & Gandıa, 2014; Vander Bauwhede, De Meyere, & Van Cauwenberge, 2015).
A second limitation is related with the ‘staleness’ of the variable, in the sense that a
portion of the observed interest rate is due to contracts from previous years (Cassar,
2011). The inclusion of the same variable lagged one period as a control variable can
Panel B: Sample distribution by auditor choice
Year Small Auditors Middle-Tier Auditors Big Auditors Total
2010 2,769 131 130 3,030
2011 2,620 123 139 2,882
2012 2,866 93 164 3,123
2013 2,728 93 164 2,985
2014 2,041 65 136 2,242
2015 1,969 60 123 2,152
2016 1,726 48 103 1,877
2017 1,518 44 97 1,659
Total 18,237 657 1,056 19,950
Voluntary Audits 1506 78 164 1,748
86.16% 4.46% 9.38% (100.00%)
Mandatory Audits 16,731 579 892 18,202
91.92% 3.18% 4.90% (100.00%)
Total 18,237 657 1,056 19,950
(91.41%) (3.29%) (5.29%) (100.00%)
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
Table 1. Sample distribution.
Panel A: Sample distribution by audit status
Year Voluntary Audits Mandatory Audits Total
2010 164 5.41% 2,866 94.59% 3,030
2011 238 8.26% 2,644 91.74% 2,882
2012 295 9.45% 2,828 90.55% 3,123
2013 260 8.71% 2,725 91.29% 2,985
2014 240 10.70% 2,002 89.30% 2,242
2015 240 11.15% 1,912 88.85% 2,152
2016 181 9.64% 1,696 90.36% 1,877
2017 130 7.84% 1,529 92.16% 1,659
Total 1,748 8.76% 18,202 91.24% 19,950
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mitigate this problem (Cano Rodrıguez et al., 2016), so we do an additional analysis
including this variable.
Model [1a] includes VOL, a dummy which equals 1 when a company is below
SAT and thus a priori voluntarily audited, and 0 for mandatory audits, and tests
whether the cost of debt is different depending on whether audits are voluntary or
mandatory, i.e. to test Hypothesis 1. Model [1a] also includes LNFEES, which is the
natural logarithm of the audit fees paid by the company, and it is used to test
Hypothesis 2. Finally, with the aim of testing Hypothesis 3, we include the interaction
term between VOL and LNFEES (INTER). This variable capture if the association
between LNFEES and COST_D is different depending on whether the audit is volun-
tary or mandatory. Since VOL is a dummy variable, INTER is 0 for mandatorily aud-
ited companies, while is equal to LNFEES for voluntary audits. Therefore, the effect
of audit fees for mandatory audits is observed from b2, while b2þb3 shows the effect
of audit fees for voluntary audits.
We include in the model a set of control variables used in previous empirical
research, all of them lagged one period with COST_D. Prior literature shows that
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Distributional properties (19,950 observations)
Variable Mean S. Dev. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
COST_D 0.0466 0.0229 0.0138 0.0293 0.0424 0.0588 0.1173
COST_D_LAG 0.0490 0.0222 0.0150 0.0327 0.0451 0.0605 0.1177
LNASS 8.8101 0.5158 7.7765 8.4576 8.7783 9.1128 10.3165
ROBA 0.0616 0.0700 –0.1392 0.0276 0.0550 0.0913 0.2801
LEV 0.3022 0.1721 0.0212 0.1638 0.2878 0.4233 0.7251
LIQ 1.6853 0.9990 0.4598 1.0977 1.3898 1.9389 5.8074
TAN 0.2529 0.1846 0.0047 0.1022 0.2189 0.3675 0.7818
GROWTH 0.0009 0.1902 –0.4703 –0.1040 0.0010 0.0980 0.5662
SOLV 1.9327 0.9329 1.0359 1.3345 1.6318 2.1821 5.6984
COV 7.8914 18.2502 –11.6970 1.2810 2.6082 7.4597 97.8000
AGE 23.5645 10.8823 5.0000 16.0000 22.0000 30.0000 57.0000
LNFEES 1.9878 0.3449 1.2238 1.7579 1.9678 2.2083 2.8622







Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff t
COST_D 0.0458 0.0226 0.0467 0.0230 –0.0009 –1.50
COST_D_LAG 0.0480 0.0222 0.0491 0.0222 –0.0011 –1.89
LNASS 8.5482 0.6753 8.8353 0.4905 –0.2871 –22.51
ROBA 0.0423 0.0742 0.0634 0.0693 –0.0211 –12.09
LEV 0.2963 0.1753 0.3028 0.1718 –0.0066 –1.52
LIQ 1.8934 1.2108 1.6653 0.9739 0.2280 9.13
TAN 0.2890 0.2114 0.2494 0.1815 0.0396 8.58
GROWTH 0.0162 0.2025 –0.0006 0.1889 0.0168 3.53
SOLV 2.2015 1.1166 1.9068 0.9092 0.2946 12.66
COV 5.8507 17.1865 8.0873 18.3376 –2.2367 –4.90
AGE 24.3764 11.2048 23.4865 10.8480 0.8899 3.27
LNFEES 1.8629 0.3508 1.9998 0.3420 –0.1370 –15.96
COST_D: Cost of debt; COST_D_LAG: Cost of debt lagged one period; LNASS: Natural logarithm of total assets;
ROBA: Return on Business Assets; LEV: Leverage; LIQ: Liquidity ratio; TAN: Tangibility ratio; GROWTH: Growth of sales;
SOLV: Solvency ratio; COV: Coverage ratio; AGE: Age of the company; LNFEES: Natural logarithm of audit fees.,  and  denote coefficients’ statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
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larger firms are considered to be less risky than small companies (Huguet & Gandıa,
2014; Vander Bauwhede et al., 2015), so we include the natural logarithm of the total
assets as a proxy for the company size (LNASS). We also include the Return on
Business Assets (ROBA) to control for the firm performance (Kim et al., 2011).
Following Huguet and Gandıa (2014), we also include the leverage (LEV) and its
squared term (LEV_SQ). Liquidity ratio (LIQ), solvency ratio (SOLV) and coverage
ratio (COV) are included to control for the association of the financial soundness of
the company with its financing costs. We also include the variable tangibility (TAN),
defined as the ratio of PP&E to total assets, since a negative association between the
level of PP&E and the cost of debt is expected (Gill de Albornoz Noguer & Illueca,
2007; Kim et al., 2011). Company growth is included to control for its potential
effects on the cost of debt (Kim et al., 2011; Cano Rodrıguez & Sanchez Alegrıa,
2012). We also include the age of the company (AGE) because older companies are
perceived to be less risky (Lennox & Pittman, 2011; Vander Bauwhede et al., 2015).
Finally, we include year dummies to control for unobserved and time-specific effects.
With regard to Model [1b], previous literature has considered that the auditor
choice may affect the cost of debt (Karjalainen, 2011; Pittman & Fortin, 2004).
Nevertheless, papers on the SMEs setting have not found a significant association
between these variables (Huguet & Gandıa, 2014; Kim et al., 2011). For this reason,
Model [1b] complements Model [1a] by including two proxies for auditor choice:
LARGE, which equals 1 for companies audited by a Big 4 or a Middle-Tier firm and
0 otherwise; and BIG, which equals 1 for companies audited by a Big 4 auditor and 0
otherwise. Following prior literature (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2010; Gandıa &
Huguet, 2018; Sundgren & Svanstr€om, 2013), we have considered BDO and Grant
Thornton as Middle-Tier firms.
Previous literature has shown that the use of audit-based variables is often affected
by endogeneity problems (Cano Rodrıguez & Sanchez Alegrıa, 2012; Huguet &
Gandıa, 2014; Kim et al., 2011). Although some papers try to mitigate the endogene-
ity problems using a Heckman two-stage approach (Pittman & Fortin, 2004; Cano
Rodrıguez et al., 2016), literature shows that Heckman results depend on a proper
selection of the instrumental variables, and results lack on robustness, being even
more biased and unreliable than OLS estimations (Clatworthy, Makepeace, & Peel,
2009; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Lennox, Francis, & Wang, 2012). Some authors
(Francis, 2011; Lennox et al., 2012; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012) suggest that the
use of a fixed-effects (FE) regression can mitigate the potential self-selection bias and
omitted variables problems as long as the unobserved source of endogeneity is time-
invariant, and this approach has been used by previous literature (Huguet & Gandıa,
2016; Kim et al., 2011; Zaman Groff, Trobec, & Iglicar, 2017). For this reason, we
estimate Equations (1a) and (1b) using a firm FE regression procedure. Furthermore,
as stated by Wintoki et al. (2012), endogeneity problems can also be mitigated to the
extent that the test and control variables are lagged one period.
On the other hand, we have to note that the association between audit fees and
the cost of debt may not be really significant, and thus we should observe the associ-
ation between the cost of debt and abnormal fees, i.e. the differences between the
actual fees and the normal fees should be paid, according to the company
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characteristics. For this reason, we reformulate Models [1a] and [1b] by replacing
LNFEES with AB_LNFEES. To do so, we first need to calculate AB_LNFEES, so we
have to calculate the expected audited fees, which are estimated by regressing the fol-
lowing regression model:
LNFEESit ¼ aþ b1LARGEit þ b2BIGit þ b3LNASSit þ b4LNSALit þ b5LNEMPit
þ b6INVRECit þ b7ACQit þ b8INT ASSit þ b9UNUSit þ b10SIMP GAAPit
þ b11NUM SUBSit þ b12GROUPit þ b13LEVit þ b14CHLEVit þ b15GROWTHit
þ b16ROBAit þ b17NEGEARNit þ b18NEGROBAit þ b19CURRENTit
þ b20QUICKit þ b21SOLVit þ b22CHSOLV it þ b23MODit þ b24YEARENDit
þ b25CCITY it þ b26AGEit þ c1DUMMY INDit þ c2DUMMY YEARSþ eit
(2)
The model estimates a linear regression in which LNFEES is function of a series of
determinants of audit fees, which have been tested by previous literature (Gandıa &
Huguet, 2018; Zaman Groff et al., 2017) and control for auditor size, company size
(natural logarithm of total assets, natural logarithm of net turnover and natural loga-
rithm of number of employees), company complexity (proportion of inventory and
receivables over total assets, acquisitions, proportion of intangibles, reporting of
unusual items in the income statement, use of simplified GAAP, number of subsidia-
ries, and whether the company belongs a group), company risk (leverage, changes in
leverage, company growth, profitability, presence of negative earnings, interaction
between profitability and negative earnings, current ratio, quick ratio, solvency ratio
and changes in the solvency ratio), presence of modified audit reports, year-end date,
if the company is located in Madrid or Barcelona, and the age of the company. The
model also includes year and industry dummies. AB_LNFEES is calculated as the dif-
ference between LNFEES and the fitted values of the regression model.
COST Dit ¼ aþ b1VOLit þ b2AB LNFEESit þ b3INTER ABit þ c4CONTROLit þ eit
(3a)
COST Dit ¼ aþ b1VOLit þ b2AB LNFEESit þ b3INTER ABit þ b3LARGEit þ b3BIGit




This Section presents the FE regression results of Models [1a] and [1b]. First, we
compute a correlation matrix (Table 3) to examine potential multicollinearity prob-
lems. The highest correlation is that between GROWTH and LIQ (0.7253), followed
by those between SOLV and LEV (-0.5735), COV and ROBA (0.4971), COV and
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12 J. L. GANDIA AND D. HUGUET
SOLV (0.3909), and COV and LEV (-0.3897). Since all the correlations are below
0.80, we do not expect collinearity problems (Clatworthy & Peel, 2007; Firth, 1997).
We then ran Models [1a] and [1b]. Table 4 reports the results obtained by FE
regressions in these samples. We can see that the explanatory of both models is qualita-
tively similar (around 29.28%), as well as the coefficients of the variables. The two add-
itional variables included in Model 1b are not significant, in line with prior studies on
SMEs (Huguet & Gandıa, 2014; Kim et al., 2011). Regarding the control variables, we
can observe that most of the variables are significant and have the predicted sign. Only
two variables (ROBA and TAN) are not significant. Larger companies (LNASS), older
companies (AGE), and companies with higher financial soundness (LIQ, SOLV and
COV) have a lower cost of debt. With regard to LEV and LEV_SQ, we can observe a
non-linear relationship, as stated by Huguet and Gandıa (2014), what involves that
companies profit from a lower cost of debt as leverage increases (better conditions as a
consequence of higher trading) until a level from which the risk taken by lenders
moves this effect, and thus the cost of debt rises as leverage increases.
With regard to Hypothesis 1, we can see that VOL is significantly positive, what
suggests that voluntarily audited companies pay higher fees than mandatorily audited
companies. This may be due to the fact that voluntary audits are perceived as less
credible than mandatory audits. However, as we will explain when examining
Hypothesis 3, voluntary audits may signal their commitment with audit quality via
audit fees. Regarding Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of LNFEES is not significant in any
of the regressions, so results do not support the idea that mandatorily audited
Table 4. Fixed-effects regression results.
Model 1a Model 1b
Coeff. t Coeff. t
VOL 0.0099 2.95 0.0098 2.92
LNFEES –0.0005 –0.47 –0.0006 –0.59
INTER –0.0056 –3.21 –0.0056 –3.17
LARGE – –0.0002 –0.15
BIG – 0.0015 0.93
LNASS –0.0058 –7.99 –0.0058 –8.02
ROBA 0.0022 0.85 0.0023 0.89
LEV –0.0824 –17.53 –0.0823 –17.51
LEV_SQ 0.0687 11.57 0.0687 11.56
LIQ –0.0013 –3.96 –0.0013 –3.96
TAN –0.0035 –1.59 –0.0035 –1.61
GROWTH 0.0015 2.17 0.0015 2.18
SOLV –0.0013 –3.08 –0.0013 –3.07
COV 0.0000 –4.17 0.0000 –4.18
AGE –0.0049 –20.25 –0.0049 –20.26




COST_D: Cost of debt; VOL: 1 if voluntary audits, 0 if mandatory audits; LNFEES: Natural logarithm of audit fees;
INTER: Interaction of VOL and LNFEES; LARGE: 1 if audited by Big 4 or Middle-Tier, 0 if audited by small auditor; BIG:
1 if audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise; LNASS: Natural logarithm of total assets; ROBA: Return on Business Assets; LEV:
Leverage; LIQ: Liquidity ratio; TAN: Tangibility ratio; GROWTH: Growth of sales; SOLV: Solvency ratio; COV: Coverage
ratio; AGE: Age of the company.,  and  denote coefficients’ statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Coefficients of year dummies are not included for parsimony.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
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companies that pay higher audit fees are charged with lower financing costs.
Therefore, among mandatory audits, audit fees do not seem to have relevance for
lenders, what can be due to the fact that differences in the audit fees among manda-
tory audits are not perceived as affecting audit quality.
With regard to Hypothesis 3, we can see that the coefficient of INTER is signifi-
cantly negative, suggesting that audit fees help to reduce the cost of debt when com-
panies are voluntarily audited. Considering the combined effect of VOL and INTER,
we can see that the negative coefficient of LNFEES prevails over that of VOL, and
thus voluntarily audited companies may be charged with a lower cost of debt if they
are willing to pay enough for the audit. As an example, a voluntarily audit firm that
pay e7,3002 has a cost of debt that is 2.29 basis points lower than a mandatorily audit
firm. Solving an algebraic operation, we can estimate that the minimum audit fees for
which voluntary audits have a reduction on the cost of debt is approximately e5,700.
These results also show an asymmetric effect audit fees on the cost of debt, depend-
ing on whether the audit is voluntary or mandatory.
4.2. Consideration of abnormal fees
As stated in Section 3.2, we have to note that the effect of LNFEES on the cost of
debt is not significant, because what really matters for lenders is the deviations of the
actual fees to the expected fees, i.e. the abnormal fees. Therefore, we run Model [2]
to estimate the expected fees, according to the company characteristics. Then, we cal-
culate AB_LNFEES as the difference between LNFEES and the fitted values of the
regression, and use AB_LNFEES to run Models [3a] and [3b]. Table 5 shows the
results of Model [2] for the estimation of AB_LNFEES, and regression results for
Models [3a] and [3b] are shown in Table 6.
Results from Table 5 show that the R2 of the model is 21.49%. Although it seems
somewhat lower, we have to note that the explanatory power of the model is similar
to studies focused on small audited companies (Gandıa & Huguet, 2018; Peel &
Roberts, 2003), what is due to the strong link of audit fees to corporate size (Hope &
Langli, 2010), as well as the lower sensitivity of audit pricing to changes in corporate
size, rather than misspecification problems (Peel & Roberts, 2003). On the other
hand, we can see that most of the variables are significant, so we rely on the fitted
values of this regression to estimate AB_LNFEES. Panel B and C show the descriptive
statistics of AB_LNFEES. We can see that, on average, AB_LNFEES is negative, and
voluntarily audited companies have lower abnormal audit fees than mandatory audits,
what is in line with expectations that larger firms pay higher audit fees.
Results from Table 6 show that neither VOL nor AB_LNFEES are significant, while
INTER_AB is significantly negative, being qualitatively similar to INTER. Therefore,
these results can be similarly interpreted to those of Table 4: voluntarily audited com-
panies may profit from a lower cost of debt if they signal their commitment with
audit quality paying higher abnormal fees. Considering the coefficient of Model [3.a],
voluntarily audited companies that pay abnormal fees higher than e1,000 will have a
reduction in their cost of debt.
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Panel B: Distributional properties of AB_LNFEES (16,714 observations)
Variable Mean S. Dev. 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
AB_LNFEES –0.0015 0.3062 –0.6928 –0.2105 –0.0071 0.2091 0.7088







Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff t
AB_LNFEES –0.0156 0.3078 0.0000 0.3060 –0.0156 –1.92
LARGE: 1 if audited by Big 4 or Middle-Tier, 0 if audited by small auditor; BIG: 1 if audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise;
LNASS: Natural logarithm of total assets; LNSAL: Natural logarithm of net sales; LNEMP: Natural logarithm of number
of employees; INVREC: Ratio of inventory and receivables to total assets; ACQ: 1 if company made acquisitions, 0
otherwise; INT_ASS: Ratio of intangible assets to total assets; UNUS: 1 if unusual items in the income statement, 0
otherwise; SIMP_GAAP: 1 if use of simplified GAAP, 0 otherwise; NUM_SUBS: Number of subsidiaries; GROUP: 1 if
company belongs a group, 0 otherwise; LEV: Leverage; CH_LEV: Changes in leverage; GROWTH: Growth in sales;
ROBA: Return on business assets; N_EARN: 1 if negative earnings, 0 otherwise; NEG_ROBA: Interaction of N_EARN
and ROBA; CURRENT: Current ratio; QUICK: Quick ratio; SOLV: Solvency ratio; CH_SOLV: Changes in solvency;
MOD_REP: 1 if modified report, 0 otherwise; YEAR_END: 1 if year-end 31 December, 0 otherwise; C_CITY: 1 if com-
pany located in Madrid or Barcelona, 0 otherwise; AGE: Age of the company.,  and  denote coefficients’ statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Source: Authors' own estimations.
Table 5. Abnormal fees.




























Industry Dummies 0.1450 4.12
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4.3. Control for the cost of debt lagged one period
On the other hand, as explained in Section 3.2, COST_D may suffer from staleness,
in the sense that a portion of the observed interest rate is due to contract from previ-
ous years. Some studies have mitigated this problem by including the variable lagged
one period as an additional control variable (Huguet & Gandıa, 2014; Cano
Rodrıguez et al., 2016). Therefore, we carry out an additional analysis including
COST_D_LAG to Models [1a], [1b], [3a] and [3b]. Results are reported in Table 7.
We can see that the explanatory power of the models increases after the inclusion of
COST_D_LAG, (from 29.28% to 34.26% in Model [1a], and from 33.26% to 37.26% in
Model [3b]). Nevertheless, we have to note that some authors state that the use of
lagged variables in fixed-effects estimations is problematic (Nickell, 1981; Angrist and
Pischke, 2009), so different results from these regressions should be interpreted with
caution. However, we can observe that the sign of the coefficients and their significance
are qualitatively similar to those reported in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, so results from this
additional analysis support those obtained in the main analysis.
4.4. Voluntary vs mandatory audit
As we have explained in Section 3.1, the sample is composed of companies below
SAT (a priori voluntarily audited) and above SAT (mandatorily audited). We have
observed in Sections 4.1 to 4.3 that the interaction term is significantly negative, what
suggests the effect of audit fees is asymmetrical depending on the audit is voluntary
Table 6. Regression results with abnormal fees (AB_LNFEES).
Model 3a Model 3b
Coeff. t Coeff. t
VOL –0.0011 –1.39 –0.0010 –1.36
AB_LNFEES –0.0005 –0.38 –0.0005 –0.43
INTER_AB –0.0075 –3.37 –0.0074 –3.35
LARGE – –0.0028 –1.63
BIG – 0.0040 2.02
LNASS –0.0060 –7.40 –0.0061 –7.43
ROBA 0.0036 1.26 0.0036 1.28
LEV –0.0859 –16.50 –0.0860 –16.51
LEV_SQ 0.0702 10.57 0.0703 10.58
LIQ –0.0012 –3.33 –0.0012 –3.33
TAN –0.0049 –2.00 –0.0050 –2.05
GROWTH 0.0018 2.42 0.0018 2.41
SOLV –0.0012 –2.47 –0.0012 –2.50
COV 0.0000 –3.77 0.0000 –3.79
AGE –0.0049 –20.27 –0.0049 –20.30




COST_D: Cost of debt; VOL: 1 if voluntary audits, 0 if mandatory audits; AB_LNFEES: Abnormal LNFEES; INTER_AB:
Interaction of VOL and AB_LNFEES; LARGE: 1 if audited by Big 4 or Middle-Tier, 0 if audited by small auditor; BIG: 1
if audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise; LNASS: Natural logarithm of total assets; ROBA: Return on Business Assets; LEV:
Leverage; LIQ: Liquidity ratio; TAN: Tangibility ratio; GROWTH: Growth of sales; SOLV: Solvency ratio; COV: Coverage
ratio; AGE: Age of the company.,  and  denote coefficients’ statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Coefficients of year dummies are not included for parsimony.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
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or mandatory. In order to disentangle this effect, but avoiding the use of the inter-
action term. we run separately Models [1a] and [3a] for the subsamples of companies
below (VOL¼ 1) and above SAT (VOL¼ 0), excluding VOL and INTER. Results are
reported in Table 8.
Table 7. Regression results with COST_D_LAG.
Panel A: LNFEES
Model 1a Model 1b
Coeff. t Coeff. t
COST_D_LAG 0.2712 33.00 0.2711 32.99
VOL 0.0094 2.91 0.0093 2.89
LNFEES –0.0001 –0.08 –0.0002 –0.19
INTER –0.0051 –3.03 –0.0051 –3.00
LARGE – –0.0005 –0.37
BIG – 0.0016 0.99
LNASS –0.0040 –5.70 –0.0040 –5.72
ROBA –0.0140 –5.53 –0.0139 –5.49
LEV –0.0555 –12.05 –0.0555 –12.04
LEV_SQ 0.0432 7.47 0.0432 7.47
LIQ –0.0011 –3.47 –0.0011 –3.47
TAN –0.0023 –1.10 –0.0024 –1.12
GROWTH 0.0007 1.03 0.0007 1.03
SOLV –0.0012 –2.92 –0.0012 –2.91
COV 0.0000 3.57 0.0000 3.56
AGE –0.0029 –11.91 –0.0029 –11.92
Year Dummies Yes Yes





Model 3a Model 3b
Coeff. t Coeff. t
COST_D_LAG 0.2486 27.34 0.2487 27.35
VOL –0.0005 –0.63 –0.0004 –0.60
AB_LNFEES 0.0004 0.31 0.0003 0.26
INTER_AB –0.0063 –2.94 –0.0063 –2.93
LARGE – –0.0032 –1.93
BIG – 0.0041 2.11
LNASS –0.0042 –5.31 –0.0042 –5.32
ROBA –0.0112 –3.98 –0.0111 –3.97
LEV –0.0608 –11.85 –0.0609 –11.86
LEV_SQ 0.0466 7.16 0.0466 7.18
LIQ –0.0009 –2.68 –0.0009 –2.67
TAN –0.0030 –1.24 –0.0031 –1.29
GROWTH 0.0011 1.52 0.0011 1.50
SOLV –0.0013 –2.72 –0.0013 –2.75
COV 0.0000 2.61 0.0000 2.59
AGE –0.0030 –12.42 –0.0030 –12.45
Year Dummies Yes Yes




COST_D: Cost of debt; VOL: 1 if voluntary audits, 0 if mandatory audits; LNFEES: Natural logarithm of audit fees;
INTER: Interaction of VOL and LNFEES; AB_LNFEES: Abnormal LNFEES; INTER_AB: Interaction of AB_LNFEES and VOL;
LARGE: 1 if audited by Big 4 or Middle-Tier, 0 if audited by small auditor; BIG: 1 if audited by Big 4, 0 otherwise;
LNASS: Natural logarithm of total assets; ROBA: Return on Business Assets; LEV: Leverage; LIQ: Liquidity ratio; TAN:
Tangibility ratio; GROWTH: Growth of sales; SOLV: Solvency ratio; COV: Coverage ratio; AGE: Age of the company.,  and  denote coefficients’ statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Coefficients of year dummies are not included for parsimony.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
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As we can see, the coefficient of LNFEES is significantly negative for the sub-sam-
ple below SAT, whereas is not significant for the sample above SAT. Results are simi-
lar in Panel B, when using AB_LNFEES. These results support those reported in
Sections 4.1 to 4.3, and they confirm that the effect of audit fees on the cost of debt
is asymmetrical depending on the character of the audit: Voluntary audits are charged
with a lower cost of debt when audit fees are higher, while there are no differences
on the cost of debt for mandatory audits based on the fees paid to auditors. These
results support the hypothesis that voluntary audits can signal their commitment with
accounting through the price of the audit.
5. Conclusions
Few studies have examined the association between audit fees and the cost of debt, and
the evidence is mixed. Furthermore, the empirical evidence about the effects of
Table 8. Voluntary vs mandatory audits.
Panel A: Model 1a
Below SAT Above SAT
Coef. t Coef. t
LNFEES –0.0069 –1.87 0.0004 0.36
LNASS –0.0006 –0.19 –0.0062 –8.14
ROBA –0.0177 –1.90 0.0032 1.17
LEV –0.0891 –5.01 –0.0840 –16.85
LEV_SQ 0.0571 2.62 0.0727 11.47
LIQ 0.0004 0.55 –0.0012 –3.44
TAN 0.0139 1.68 –0.0039 –1.69
GROWTH –0.0023 –0.95 0.0014 1.87
SOLV –0.0023 –1.82 –0.0015 –3.02
COV –0.0001 –1.13 0.0000 –3.91
AGE –0.0040 –4.58 –0.0049 –19.24




Panel B: Model 3a
Below SAT Above SAT
cost_d_d Coef. t Coef. t
AB_LNFEES –0.0087 –2.28 0.0000 –0.01
LNASS –0.0032 –0.91 –0.0062 –7.22
ROBA –0.0038 –0.40 0.0034 1.13
LEV –0.1006 –5.25 –0.0864 –15.62
LEV_SQ 0.0721 2.99 0.0729 10.28
LIQ 0.0005 0.58 –0.0011 –2.70
TAN 0.0186 2.11 –0.0059 –2.27
GROWTH –0.0028 –1.12 0.0017 2.06
SOLV –0.0022 –1.61 –0.0014 –2.56
COV –0.0001 –1.82 0.0000 –2.98
AGE –0.0035 –4.13 –0.0049 –19.54




COST_D: Cost of debt; LNFEES: Natural logarithm of audit fees; AB_LNFEES: Abnormal LNFEES; LNASS: Natural loga-
rithm of total assets; ROBA: Return on Business Assets; LEV: Leverage; LIQ: Liquidity ratio; TAN: Tangibility ratio;
GROWTH: Growth of sales; SOLV: Solvency ratio; COV: Coverage ratio; AGE: Age of the company.,  and  denote coefficients’ statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively.
Coefficients of year dummies are not included for parsimony.
Source: Authors’ own estimations.
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voluntary audits on the cost of debt is also mixed. This study examines whether the
association between cost of debt and voluntary audits can be affected by the fees paid
to auditors. Particularly, and based on the credence goods theory, we examine whether,
in the voluntary audit setting, there are differences in the perception of audit quality by
users, or in the signalling effect of auditing, depending on the audit fees.
Using a sample of Spanish audited SMEs, we examine whether voluntary audits
have a lower cost of debt as compared to mandatory audits, as well as whether there
is an association between audit fees and the cost of debt, and if this effect is different
between voluntary and mandatory audits. Results show an asymmetric effect of audit
fees on the cost of debt: higher audit fees are associated with a lower cost of debt for
voluntarily audited companies, while the association is not significant for mandatory
audits. Results remain unchanged after the inclusion of auditor-type variables and the
inclusion of the cost of debt lagged one period as a control variable. Separate regres-
sions for voluntary and mandatory audits also show the asymmetrical effect of audit
fees depending on the type of audit. These results are linked to prior literature that
shows an audit fee premium for voluntary audits as compared to mandatory audits:
audits, as credence goods, can use price to signal quality, so auditees that seek to sig-
nal a commitment with accounting quality may be willing to pay a premium in the
voluntary setting, and lenders may value the signalling effect of price, explaining the
negative association between audit fees and the cost of debt when companies are vol-
untarily audited.
The paper has several limitations. First, estimations can be affected by endogeneity
problems. We have tried to mitigate them using FE regressions, but we cannot rule
out completely that the association between the cost of debt and audit-based variables
is not unidirectional. A second limitation is related with the definition of voluntary
audits. We have considered that companies below SAT are exempt from the audit
requirement, but they can be mandatorily audited by other reasons. Since we do not
have any information about the reason they are being audited, we cannot ensure that
these companies are audited on a voluntary basis.
Results are also of relevance for managers, who are in charge of the preparation of
the financial statements of the companies and have to look out for the credibility and
reputation of the company, including the financial information.
The paper presents several opportunities for future research. First, since we found
that there is an association between the cost of debt and audit fees when companies
are voluntarily audited, it would be appropriate to examine whether audit fees have
also an effect on the association between the auditor type (Big 4, Middle-Tier auditors
and small auditors) and the cost of debt of audited companies. Furthermore, we
should examine whether audit quality is affected by audit fees, and the combined
effect of voluntary audits and audit fees on audit quality. On the other hand, results
about the interaction between voluntary audits and audit fees should encourage to
examine the interaction of other audit characteristics that may affect both audit qual-
ity and the credibility of auditors and financial information. Finally, given that man-
agers are in charge of the preparation of the financial statements of the companies,
and have to look out for the reputation of the company, future research should exam-
ine the managerial implications derived from the audit fees paid by the auditee.
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Notes
1. Since 1/1/2008 until 1/1/2016, Spanish SAT and Spanish thresholds to consider a company
as a SME (which can prepare simplified financial statements) were the same, but the latter
were increased up to the EU limits as established in the Directive 2013/34/EU.
2. As shown in Table 2, the mean for LNFEES is 1.9878, which corresponds with audit fees
that amount e7,300.
Disclosure statement
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